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Executive summary
We consider the lessons of the recent monetary policy normalisation experiences of Sweden, 
the United States and the United Kingdom, and analyse the European Central Bank’s forecast-
ing track record and possible factors that might explain the forecast errors. From this analysis, 
we draw the following main conclusions:
1. Monetary tightening involves major risks when the evidence of an improved inflation 
outlook is not sufficiently strong; it is better to err on the side of a possible inflation 
overshoot after a long period of undershooting;
2. Inadequate forward guidance can cause market turbulence;
3. Market participants might disregard forward guidance after large systematic forecast 
errors;
4. Terminating net asset purchases might not increase long-term rates, though it might have 
an impact on other asset prices because of the lack of portfolio rebalancing;
5. The ECB has made huge and systematic forecasting errors in the past five years, indicating 
that some of the behavioural relationships in ECB forecasting models are mis-specified. 
The ECB is not the only institution to suffer from incorrect forecasts and there should 
be broader debate on forecasting practices. However, the ECB’s forecast errors and its 
inability to lift core inflation above 1 percent have major implications;
6. Market-based inflation expectations have already started to fall in the euro area, 
suggesting that the trust has weakened in the ECB’s ability to reach its inflation aim of the 
below but close to two percent over the medium term;
7. More time is needed to see if the forecasting failures of the past five years were driven by 
factors whose impact will gradually fade away, or if the ECB’s ability to lift core inflation 
has been compromised;
8. In the meantime, a very cautious approach to monetary policy normalisation is 
recommended. A rate increase is only recommended after a significant increase in actual 
core inflation. This intention should be made clear in the ECB’s forward guidance;
9. If forecasting failures continue and core inflation does not approach two percent, the 
ECB’s credibility could be undermined, making necessary a discussion on either the 
deployment of new tools to influence core inflation, or a possible revision of the ECB’s 
inflation goal;
10. In the new ‘normal’ the natural rate of interest might remain low, and thereby central 
bank balance sheet policies will likely became part of the regular toolkit;
11. Monetary policy tools are ill-suited to address financial stability concerns in general, 
especially in the euro area. Financial stability concerns should not play a role in 
monetary policy normalisation. Instead, country-specific macroprudential policy should 
complement micro-prudential supervision and regulation. 
Policy Contribution 
Issue n˚24 | December 2018 Forecast errors and 
monetary policy 
normalisation in the euro area
Zsolt Darvas
2 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚24 | December 2018
1 Motivation
The global financial and economic crisis, which intensified after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008, has led to the deepest economic contraction in many advanced 
countries since the second world war. Unusual economic circumstances have triggered unu-
sual monetary policy measures. Central banks quickly cut their interest rates close to zero in 
2008-09 – joining the Bank of Japan, which has long implemented a close-to-zero interest rate 
policy (Figure 1).
Figure 1: One-week interbank interest rates (%), 2 January 2000 – 7 December 2018
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Source: Bruegel based on Bloomberg and Sveriges Riksbank. Note: We show the 1-week interbank rates and not central banks’ interest 
rates, because for some central banks the importance of certain rates changed (eg for the European Central Bank, the main refinancing 
operations (MRO) interest rate was the main determinant of short-term market rates before 2008, but since then the ECB’s deposit rate 
has been the main determinant). STIBOR (Stockholm Interbank Offered Rate) for the Swedish krona, LIBOR (London Interbank Offered 
Rate) for all other currencies.
Zero has long been considered a lower bound for interest rates, and close-to-zero rates 
thus gave rise to the discussion about the ‘zero lower bound’ (ZLB). The rationale for the ZLB 
is that a negative interest rate might be ineffective if agents do not want to pay a ‘fee’ (ie the 
negative interest rate) for holding deposits. Agents would instead hoard cash1. Since hold-
ing cash involves storage costs and risks of destruction and theft, the effective lower bound 
should be lower than zero, yet in 2008-09 central banks had not (yet) opted for negative inter-
est rates. Instead, several advanced country central banks adopted various other monetary 
policy measures, which aimed to ease monetary conditions further. These measures included 
large-scale asset purchases, such as government bonds and various private sector or agency 
securities (called ‘quantitative easing’) and large-scale liquidity provision measures, through 
which banks were able to obtain loans from the central bank for longer maturities and at 
more attractive terms than in the pre-crisis period. Again, the Bank of Japan was a forerun-
ner in the adoption of quantitative easing measures even before the crisis, in 2001-06. Some 
other central banks, most notably the Swiss National Bank and the Danish National Bank, 
1   Buiter (2009) made an early contribution to the discussion on how to overcome the zero lower bound. Buiter 
(2009) suggested three options: abolishing cash, taxing cash and introducing a new numéraire for measuring 
prices, or introducing an exchange rate between this new numéraire and cash. See Cœuré (2015) for a more recent 
assessment of the zero lower bound problem, and a discussion of the tools used by the ECB to overcome it.
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purchased large amounts of foreign currency to prevent the appreciation of the exchange 
rate of their currencies. These measures boosted the size of central bank balance sheets to 
unforeseen levels, at least since the second world war (Figure 2). While there were sizeable 
differences in central banks’ pre-crisis balance sheet sizes, the differences became even more 
striking after 2008.
Figure 2: Central bank balance sheets (% GDP), January 2006 – August 2018
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Source: Bruegel based on balance sheet data: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (BoJ: JPNASSETS, ECB: ECBASSETS, FED: WALCL, BoE: 
UKASSETS), Bank of England (RPQB75A), Swiss National Bank (EPB@SNB.snbbipo{T0}) and Sveriges Riksbank (The Riksbank’s assets 
and liabilities weekly report); GDP: IMF (WEO), Eurostat [nama_10_gdp], Swiss National Bank (EPB@SNB.gdpap{WMF,BBIP}) and Statistics 
Sweden quarterly accounts (GDP at market prices). 
As the economic outlook improves and inflation gradually increases, the key questions 
are when and how these historically unprecedented monetary policy measures should be 
normalised, and to what levels. In fact, Figure 1 shows that euro and Swedish short-term 
interest rates started to increase from mid-2010, reflecting monetary tightening by the Euro-
pean Central Bank and the Sveriges Riksbank. In both currency areas, the tightening proved 
to be short-lived. An even more significant period of monetary policy easing has followed, 
suggesting that the mid-2010 normalisation attempts were premature. We will scrutinise 
these episodes.
More recently, the Federal Reserve started to take several steps toward monetary policy 
normalisation, following the sequence: 1) gradual reduction in net asset purchases; 2) 
stopping net asset purchases (with maturing asset holdings reinvested to keep the stock 
of assets unchanged); 3) increasing the interest rate a few times; 4) gradually reducing 
reinvestments to allow asset holdings to shrink, while continuing the gradual process of 
increasing the interest rate. The key dates for the US in relation to the third and last round of 
quantitative easing were December 2013 for stage 1, September 2014 for stage 2, December 
2015 for stage 3 and September 2017 for stage 4. 
Other central banks have followed this sequence. The Bank of England started a nor-
malisation process in 2012, but the Brexit referendum in 2016 triggered a new round of 
quantitative easing. Since economic developments were more favourable than predicted 
in the immediate aftermath of the referendum and inflation started to accelerate, partly 
because of the significant depreciation of the pound sterling, the Bank of England started a 
normalisation process by increasing the base rate by 25 basis points in November 2017 and 
then again in August 2018, thereby reaching stage 3.
The central banks of the euro area, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland have not yet started 
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to lift interest rates, though asset purchases have ended in Sweden and are expected to end 
by end-2018 in the euro area. The Bank of Japan has not yet announced a reduction in the 
monthly amount of asset purchases, though Shirai (2018) noticed that there has been a 
reduction. 
This Policy Contribution assesses the monetary policy normalisation process from the 
perspective of the euro area. We answer, for the euro area, the questions of when and how 
to normalise monetary policy measures2, questions that are ultimately linked to achieving 
the ECB’s inflationary objective. 
We first analyse certain problems that characterised the monetary policy normalisa-
tion processes in Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom. We then scrutinise 
the possible ‘new normal’ for monetary policy in terms of interest rates and central bank 
balance sheets. Third, we analyse the track record of ECB inflation forecasts and assess the 
factors that might have contributed to forecast errors. And fourth, we briefly assess whether 
financial stability concerns should play a role in monetary policy normalisation.
2 Lessons from monetary policy exit 
mistakes in Sweden, the US and the UK 
The central banks of Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom adopted certain 
monetary policy normalisation measures, leading to adverse market reactions. These ep-
isodes offer valuable lessons for monetary policy normalisation by other central banks. In 
Sweden, a premature exit started in summer 2010, followed by massive monetary policy 
easing. The examples from the United States (late 2012 to summer 2013) and the United 
Kingdom (summer 2013 to summer 2014) share many similarities with each other. In both 
the US and UK, the future interest rate increase was initially linked to a certain level of 
unemployment and was then de-linked when the unemployment rate fell. Other com-
munication and forward guidance problems suggesting a near-term interest rate increase 
have contributed to a significant but temporary increase in long-maturity government 
bond yields, followed by an even more significant bond yield decline.
2.1 Sweden: premature exit followed by massive monetary policy easing
Sweden provides an example of premature exit from expansive monetary policies, which 
then had to be reversed and were followed by an even more significant monetary easing. 
When the global financial crisis intensified after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in Sep-
tember 2008, the Sveriges Riksbank, Sweden’s central bank, cut its main monetary policy 
rate. The so-called repo rate (at which banks can borrow or deposit funds at the Riksbank 
for a period of seven days) was cut from 4.75 percent in October 2008 to 0.25 percent in 
July 2009 (Figure 3). However, between July 2010 and July 2011, the Riksbank increased its 
main policy rate from 0.25 percent to 2 percent in seven steps, largely to address finan-
cial stability concerns (Svensson, 2014). The rapid 2010 recovery from the deep 2009 
recession (Figure 4) probably gave the Riksbank confidence to pursue monetary policy 
tightening. 
2   Under ‘monetary policy measures’ we consider policies aimed at influencing monetary conditions and meeting 
the primary objective(s) of the central bank (for example, inflation in the euro area and both inflation and full 
employment in the United States). Several other policy measures were introduced with a view to supporting fi-
nancial stability, including some of the long-term refinancing operation of the ECB in 2007-09. Our focus is on the 
monetary policy measures only. 
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Figure 3: Swedish interest rates (%), 2 January 2008 – 7 December 2018
Source: Sveriges Riksbank, https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/statistics/search-interest--exchange-rates/. Note: The repo rate has been the 
Riksbank’s policy rate since 1994. The repo rate is the rate of interest at which banks can borrow or deposit funds at the Riksbank for a 
period of seven days. In addition, the Riksbank has an overnight deposit facility, which has an interest rate 0.75 percentage points lower 
than the repo rate, and an overnight borrowing facility, which has a rate 0.75 percentage points higher than the repo rate.
Sweden is an open economy and external shocks, such as the global financial crisis which 
originated in the US, and the double-dip recession in the euro area, likely played major roles 
in the economic development of Sweden. Yet according to Svensson (2014), the premature 
monetary policy tightening also contributed to macroeconomic fluctuations: it led to high 
costs in terms of excessively low inflation, overly high unemployment and a higher real debt 
burden for households. Inflation fell quickly after 2011 and even in 2014 was close to zero, 
well below the 2 percent target (Figure 4). The unemployment rate also fell less rapidly than 
under a counterfactual scenario of continued low interest rates, suggesting that the premature 
monetary tightening pushed up the unemployment rate by about 2 percentage points for 
several years (Svensson, 2014). 
Figure 4: Some key macroeconomic indicators of Sweden, 2000Q1 – 2018Q3
Sources: Bruegel based on Eurostat datasets: ‘GDP and main components  (output, expenditure and income) [namq_10_gdp]’, ‘Unem-
ployment by sex and age - quarterly average [une_rt_q]’, ‘HICP (2015 = 100) - monthly data (annual rate of change) [prc_hicp_manr]’, and 
‘House price index (2015 = 100) - quarterly data [prc_hpi_q]’. Note: percent change compared to the same quarter of the previous except 
for the unemployment, which is in percent of the labour force.
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Ultimately, low inflation forced the Riksbank to cut rates to even lower levels: the repo rate 
was cut from 2 percent in July 2011 to -0.5 percent in February 2016. Moreover, the Riksbank 
also started to purchase Swedish government bonds for monetary policy purposes, starting 
in April 2015 with Swedish Krona 40-45 billion a month, increased to kr65 billion per month 
in October of the same year. However, although the Riksbank initially aimed to ward off the 
threat to financial stability of household over-indebtedness, the household debt-to-income 
ratio was not affected by the 2010-11 policy of tightening and in fact the ratio continued to 
increase in real terms, partly because of the very low inflation rates.
Furthermore, Riksbank interest rate guidance since 2011 turned out to have been inad-
equate. The Riksbank is among the few central banks to publish numerical forecasts for its 
main monetary policy rate (along with a confidence band). Only the 2010-11 tightening was 
in line with forecasts; Riksbank interest rate forecasts made both before and especially after 
this period, which predicted increases in the Riksbank’s own interest rate, proved to be sys-
tematically wrong (Figure 5). These systematic forecast errors call into question the usefulness 
of the publication of interest rate forecasts. 
Figure 5: The Riksbank’s repo rate: actual and Riksbank forecasts (%), 2006Q1–
2021Q3
Source: Bruegel based on various Sveriges Riksbank monetary policy reports. Note: the actual rate is the thick red line, while the other 
lines show the Riksbank forecasts.
Gradual tapering of net government bond purchases started in April 2016 with actual net 
purchases stopped at the end of 2017. Yet the Riksbank still reinvests maturing bonds to keep 
the stock of its government bond holdings unchanged, because “the Riksbank’s strategy for a 
gradual normalisation of monetary policy involves continuing to reinvest principal payments in 
the government bond portfolio for a while even after repo rate rises have begun” (Riksbank, 2018).
Therefore, even though both the headline and the core inflation rate reached the two per-
cent target in early 2017 (Figure 4), the Riksbank remained much more cautious and has not 
yet tightened monetary conditions. This cautious approach has been justified, given that core 
inflation had fallen back to 1.5 percent by mid-2018. 
It is also important to note that the 10-year government bond yield has not increased with 
the tapering and eventual stop of quantitative easing, but has largely remained in the 0.5-1 
percent range, apart from a brief episode in the autumn of 2016 when it fell close to zero (Figure 
3). The government bond yield is well below pre-crisis values. The relative stability of the 10-year 
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government bond yield is also in contrast to the Riksbank’s own prediction of a rate increase 
(Figure 5)3, suggesting the Riksbank’s forward guidance is ineffective. We cannot exclude the 
hypothesis that market participants disregard the Riksbank’s forward guidance because of the 
massive and systematic forecast errors made in the past. 
Anyhow, the Swedish experience highlights that stopping net asset purchases would not 
necessarily lead to higher long-term interest rates. 
These experiences offer important lessons to the European Central Bank: 
• Premature tightening (when the evidence of an improved inflation outlook is not suf-
ficiently strong) should be avoided; it is better to err on the side of a possible inflation 
overshoot after a long period of undershooting;
• A cautious approach to interest rate increases and balance sheet reductions could be 
justified when the inflation outlook is uncertain;
• Market participants might disregard forward guidance after large systematic forecast 
errors;
• Stopping net asset purchases might not lead to an increase in the long-term interest rate.
2.2 Federal Reserve: ‘taper tantrum’ unnecessarily pushed-up the 10-
year yield
As the US economy gradually recovered from the deep recession of 2008-09, in December 
2012 the Federal Reserve introduced a new way of forward guidance to communicate its ex-
pected policy intentions by stating a particular value of the unemployment rate, which would 
trigger monetary policy changes. The Federal Market Open Committee (FOMC) said it “an-
ticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least 
as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two 
years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee’s 2 
percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored”4. 
As Whelan (2018) noted, the clear majority of FOMC members believed at that time that the 
6.5 percent unemployment rate would not be reached until 2015.
In early 2013, the unemployment rate fell to 7.5 percent, nearing the 6.5 percent threshold. 
The FOMC started to discuss tapering (ie reducing the amount of asset purchases) of the third 
round of quantitative easing in early May 2013. Such a discussion, along with the fall in the 
unemployment rate towards the 6.5 percent threshold, raised market expectations of a federal 
funds rate increase. The expected increase in short-term interest rates led to a rather signifi-
cant increase in the 10-year yield, which increased from 1.7 percent in May 2013 to 3 percent 
a few months later (Figure 6), leading to a far greater tightening of financing conditions than 
the Fed had intended.
Eventually, the unemployment rate fell below 6.5 percent, but inflation did not pick up 
(Figure 7) and economic growth was somewhat weaker than expected. Thus, the Federal 
Reserve did not increase rates until December 2015 (when the unemployment rate was down 
to 5 percent). Later, the 10-year government bond yield fell back even below 1.7 percent, 
despite the actual tapering and ending of asset purchases and the first increase in December 
2015 in the federal funds rate. The median of the longer-term federal funds rate projections of 
FOMC members did not change between June 2014 and June 2015, and therefore the publi-
cation of these projections is unlikely to have contributed to the significant fall in the 10-year 
government bond yield in this period. Yet in the subsequent year, from June 2015 to June 
2016, this median longer-run expectation fell from 3.75 percent to 3 percent, which might 
3   According to the hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates, the long-maturity interest rate is the average 
of the current and expected short maturity interest rates plus possibly a term premium. Thereby, an expected 
increase in the short-term interest rate should lead to increases in longer maturity interest rates. 
4   https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20121212a.htm. 
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have impacted government bond yield developments. The US experience was thus similar to 
the Swedish experience and suggests that stopping net asset purchases does not necessarily 
lead to a higher long-term interest rate.
Figure 6: US interest rates (%), 2 January 2000 – 6 December 2018
Source: Bruegel based on Federal Reserve; effective federal funds rate: H15/RIFSPFF_N.B; 10-year government bond yield: H15/RIFLG-
FCY10_N.B; federal funds rate projections: collected from Projections Materials from https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
fomccalendars.htm and SEP - Accessible material from https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc_historical_year.htm . Note: 
The federal funds rate projections correspond to policymakers’ assessments of appropriate monetary policy, which, by definition, is the 
future path of policy that each participant deems most likely to foster outcomes for economic activity and inflation that best satisfy his 
or her interpretation of the Federal Reserve’s dual objectives of maximum employment and stable prices. The time-frame for longer-run 
is considered to about five or six years. We show the median value among the FOMC member projections. Numerical federal funds rate 
projections are available staring from January 2012.
Figure 7: Some key macroeconomic indicators of the United States, 2000Q1 – 
2018Q3
Source: Bruegel based on Federal Reserve Economic Data: Personal Consumption Expenditures: Chain-type Price Index (PCECTPI);  Personal Con-
sumption Expenditures: Chain-type Price Index Less Food and Energy (JCXFE); Real Gross Domestic Product (A191RO1Q156NBEA); Unemployment 
Rate, Aged 15-64, All Persons for the United States (LRUN64TTUSQ156S); All-Transactions House Price Index for the United States (USSTHPI). Note: 
percent change compared to the same quarter of the previous except for the unemployment, which is in percent of the labour force.
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2.3 Bank of England: communication and forward guidance problems 
unnecessarily pushed-up the 10-year yield
The Bank of England followed the footsteps of the Federal Reserve by linking interest rate 
increases to unemployment and later de-linking them. Communications misfortune was also 
followed by a significant increase in the long-term interest rate and a subsequent reversal.
On 4 July 2013, the Bank of England published a statement (an unusual move in the absence 
of a policy change) clarifying current policy and questioning whether expected future rates were 
in line with economic developments5. Then in August 2013, the Bank of England introduced 
new forward guidance policies, linking increases in the interest rate to unemployment falling 
below 7 percent with three so-called ‘knock-out criteria’, including a quantitative threshold for 
inflation projections 18–24 months ahead (<2.5 percent) and anchored medium-term infla-
tion expectations and the absence of financial instability risks (Filandro and Hofmann, 2014; 
Whelan, 2018). The statement said: “the MPC intends not to raise Bank Rate from its current level 
of 0.5 percent at least until the Labour Force Survey headline measure of the unemployment rate 
has fallen to a threshold of 7 percent, subject to the conditions below.”6
However, unemployment fell faster than foreseen by the Bank of England. Thus, in January 
and February 2014 the Bank of England updated its forward guidance, unlinking it from the 
decrease of the unemployment rate below 7 percent. Furthermore, in late June 2014, Mark 
Carney, the Governor of the Bank of England, suggested that the ‘new normal’ for the UK inter-
est rate is 2.5 percent and the interest rate could reach this value in early 20177. 
These statements might have played a role in the strong increase in the 10-year UK govern-
ment bond yield, from a value of about 2.2 percent in July 2013 to over 3 percent by September 
the same year. After that it fluctuated around 3 percent until July 2014, when it started to fall sig-
nificantly, to as low as 1.4 percent by January 2015 (Figure 8). We cannot exclude the hypothesis 
that inappropriate forward guidance and its reversal contributed to a temporary upward shift 
of long-maturity interest rates, causing an unintended tightening of monetary conditions. Both 
headline and core inflation, however, remained well below 2 percent (Figure 9).
Figure 8: UK interest rates (%), 2 January 2006 – 6 December 2018
Source: Bank of England. 
5   https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/news/2013/july/mpc-july-2013.pdf. 
6   Filandro and Hofmann (2014) found that futures rates did not drop following the formal introduction of forward 
guidance by the Bank of England in August 2013, suggesting that it was not effective in driving market expecta-
tions, though the two-year futures rates did drop by more than 10 basis points in July 2013 when the MPC raised 
concerns about the appropriateness of market expectations for future policy rates.
7  https://www.bbc.com/news/business-28053045. 
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Figure 9: Some key macroeconomic indicators of the United Kingdom, 2000Q1 – 2018Q3
Source: Eurostat. Note: percent change compared to the same quarter of the previous except for the unemployment, which is in percent of the 
labour force.
In terms of the actual exit from expansive policies in recent years, the UK experience has 
been quite similar to that of the US and Sweden: stopping net asset purchases hardly had an 
impact on long-term government yields, both after the third round of QE ended in November 
2012 and the fourth (post-Brexit vote) round in March 2017. Even the actual 25 basis points 
interest rate increases by the Bank of England in November 2017 and August 2018 were not 
followed by any significant increase in long-term yields, similar to developments observed in 
the US after the first few interest rate hikes. However, in terms of more recent developments, the 
uncertain outlook around Brexit might also be playing a role in relation to market reactions.
Figure 10: ECB deposit facility interest rate and 10-year government bond yields of 
four countries (%), 2 January 2000 – 7 December 2018
Source: Bruegel based on ECB and Bloomberg. Note: for asset purchases the announcement dates are indicated; the actual changes to 
purchased volumes took effect typically about 2 months later.
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The conclusion that ending net asset purchases has a negligible impact on long-term gov-
ernment bond yields seems to hold for the ECB too (so far): except for Italy, where domestic 
political shocks drove the interest rate up in recent months, in other larger euro-area countries, 
government bond yields have hardly changed since the ECB reduced and announced the end of 
net asset purchases (Figure 10).
3 A new normal in monetary policy?
Beyond the timing of monetary policy normalisation, the key questions are:
• To what level should the interest rate be increased?
• Should central bank balance sheets be reduced, and if so, to what level? 
There are reasons to believe that interest rates will be lower and central bank balance 
sheets will be larger than they were in the pre-crisis period. 
Several papers have documented the secular decline in interest rates. A recent contribu-
tion to this discussion was Del Negro et al (2018), who found that the trend in the world real 
interest rate for safe and liquid assets fluctuated close to 2 percent for more than a century, 
but has dropped close to zero over the past three decades. They find the same declining 
pattern in many advanced economies (Figure 11). These findings are consistent with the 
earlier estimates of Holston et al (2017) for four economies, Canada, the euro area, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Typically, three main explanations are offered to explain this 
secular trend (Del Negro et al, 2018; Holston et al, 2017). First, the premium that international 
investors are willing to pay to hold safe and liquid assets has increased, partly because of the 
scarcity of safe assets in the context of a global savings glut. Second, lower productivity growth 
and consequently lower economic growth drive down the real interest rate. And third, demo-
graphic factors also exert downward pressure on the natural rate of interest: populations are 
aging as people live longer, which encourages more saving, and birth rates have fallen, which 
reduces the rate of growth of the labour force and thus economic growth.
Figure 11: Estimated trend components in short-term real interest rates, 1870-2016
-1
0
1
2
3
4
18
70
18
75
18
80
18
85
18
90
18
95
19
00
19
05
19
10
19
15
19
20
19
25
19
30
19
35
19
40
19
45
19
50
19
55
19
60
19
65
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
Japan Germany Italy United States
Canada United Kingdom France
Source: Figure 3 of Del Negro et al (2018). Note: values correspond to the estimated trend components from an empirical analysis based 
on a vector autoregressive method with common trends, using a theory to derive long-run restrictions for the joint behaviour of real 
interest rates across countries. 
12 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚24 | December 2018
Williams (2018) argued that although there is uncertainty about the natural rate and its 
expected evolution, it is reasonable to assume that it will remain low, not far from current 
levels, in the foreseeable future. This would have major implications for monetary policy. A 
lower equilibrium interest rate implies that in recessions the (effective) zero lower bound 
would likely be reached more frequently, limiting the impact of traditional interest rate policy 
(Claeys and Demertzis, 2017; Foldén, 2018; Williams, 2018). Thereby, unconventional mon-
etary policy measures would be used more regularly, leading to larger central bank balance 
sheets than what was observed before 2008. 
We note that this otherwise sensible argument applies to a kind of long-term average cen-
tral bank balance sheet size, but is not very helpful as a guide for current monetary exit strate-
gies. The argument implies that in future monetary easing periods, balance sheet instruments 
will be used more often, but it does not imply that in a monetary policy normalisation phase, 
the balance sheet cannot return to its previous level if deemed appropriate.
Yet the first question to answer is whether the central bank balance sheet should be 
reduced at all. Foldén (2018) and Claeys and Demertzis (2017) discussed several arguments 
in favour of larger central bank balance sheets. This can improve the monetary transmission 
mechanism, because the large liquidity surplus (large reserves of banks held at the central 
bank8), can mitigate the risk of friction on the money market. Larger central bank balance 
sheet can provide safe assets in the form of central bank liquidity. It can also reduce banks’ 
incentives for excessive maturity transformation, which would make banking less risky.
But there are a number of arguments against a large central bank balance sheet too. 
Central bank asset holdings could alter market pricing mechanism. Large asset holdings can 
limit further asset purchases in a next monetary easing phase if the supply of assets is limited. 
It might expose the central bank to financial risk9 and undue political influence, since large 
holding of government and/or private sector assets could risk politicians wishing to rely on 
central bank asset purchases for certain political goals10.
It is notable that the Federal Reserve remained ambiguous about the targeted size of 
balance sheet reduction. Its communications related to monetary policy normalisation11 
have not specified what amount of holdings are needed to implement monetary policy: “The 
Committee intends that the Federal Reserve will, in the longer run, hold no more securities 
than necessary to implement monetary policy efficiently and effectively, and that it will hold 
primarily Treasury securities, thereby minimizing the effect of Federal Reserve holdings on the 
allocation of credit across sectors of the economy”12.
Moreover, the monetary policy normalisation communication states: “Gradually reducing 
the Federal Reserve’s securities holdings will result in a declining supply of reserve balances. The 
Committee currently anticipates reducing the quantity of reserve balances, over time, to a level 
appreciably below that seen in recent years but larger than before the financial crisis; the level 
will reflect the banking system’s demand for reserve balances and the Committee’s decisions 
about how to implement monetary policy most efficiently and effectively in the future.” Since 
the increase in bank reserves since 2008 was primarily the reflection of asset purchases, a 
bank reserve stock larger than before the financial crisis would also imply a larger stock of 
asset holdings. 
For these reasons, we conclude that the Federal Reserve remained ambiguous about the 
targeted size of its balance sheet reduction. The likely reason for this ambiguity is the lack of 
experience with balance sheet reductions. Most likely, the future direction of balance sheet 
reduction will result from a learning process, whereby the currently announced pace of 
8   See Darvas and Pichler (2018) for an analysis of bank reserve holdings in the euro area. 
9   See Chiacchio et al (2018) for an assessment of the importance of central bank profits. 
10  The size of the central bank balance sheet also depends on the way monetary policy is conducted, on the exchange 
rate regime, past monetary policy actions, central bank tasks, profits distribution. Thereby there is no universal 
benchmark for ‘normal’ central bank balance sheets.
11  https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/policy-normalization.htm. 
12  On the other hand, this statement is clear about the intended composition of asset holdings.
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balance sheet reduction will continue until the objectives of the Federal Reserve (2 percent 
inflation and full employment) are achieved in a sustainable manner, while changes to the 
pace should be expected if the objectives will be at risk.
Such inexperience also characterises the euro area, which calls for a similarly cautious 
approach from the ECB in its balance sheet reduction efforts. The advice one can make about 
the normalisation of central bank balance sheet policies is that the strategy should start only 
after the macroeconomic goals of the central bank has been achieved. The balance sheet size 
reduction should be gradual to minimise disruptions to the functioning of financial markets 
and conditional on not jeopardising the macroeconomic goals. 
4 Monetary policy exit in the euro area when 
the inflation outlook is uncertain
The primary objective of the ECB is price stability, which was defined by the ECB Governing 
Council in 1998 as inflation below two percent13. Given that Eurostat publishes inflation data 
rounded to one digit after the decimal, inflation rates in the range from 0.1 percent to 1.9 per-
cent correspond to the definition of price stability. However, in 2003 the Governing Council 
clarified that “in the pursuit of price stability it aims to maintain inflation rates below, but close 
to, 2% over the medium term”14. The duration of medium term has not been defined by the 
ECB, but is typically understood as a period of about 18 month or slightly longer15. This some-
what ambiguous clarification has been extensively used in ECB communication since 2003. 
While the ECB does not have a formal inflation target, the clarification is widely understood 
as a target rate of inflation below but close to two percent.
4.1 The ECB forecasting failures
Euro-area headline inflation long undershot this 2 percent threshold in 2013-17, but it 
reached the range of 2.0-2.2 percent between June-November 2018 (compared to the same 
month of the previous year). The recent increase in headline inflation is partly due to oil price 
increase, while core inflation (which excludes items with volatile prices like food and energy) 
remains close to 1 percent. The September 2018 forecast of the ECB itself expects the headline 
inflation to fall back to 1.5 percent by the third quarter of 2019, after which a speeding up is 
foreseen to 1.8 percent by the end of 2020. The acceleration of core inflation to 1.5 percent on 
average in 2019 and 1.8 percent on average in 2020 is also predicted by the ECB. 
The predicted core inflation increase partly reflects the economic recovery of the euro 
area and labour market improvements. Yet the large and systemic forecast errors made by the 
ECB16 raises serious doubts about the reliability of the current ECB forecasts. Panel A of Figure 
12 shows that the ECB has systematically overestimated the future developments of core 
inflation (at least since December 2013, the first time when core inflation forecasts were made 
13  https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/strategy/pricestab/html/index.en.html. 
14  Ibid.
15  The ECB’s webpage on ‘Medium-term orientation’ states: “It is impossible for any central bank to keep inflation 
always at a specific point target or to bring it back to a desired level within a very short period of time. Consequently, 
monetary policy needs to act in a forward-looking manner and can only maintain price stability over longer periods of 
time. At the same time, to retain some flexibility, it is not advisable to specify ex-ante a precise horizon for the conduct 
of monetary policy, since the transmission mechanism spans a variable, uncertain period of time. Also, the optimal 
monetary policy response to ensure price stability always depends on the specific nature and size of the shocks affecting 
the economy.” See: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/strategy/princ/html/orientation.en.html. 
16  The projections, which are published by the ECB and used by the Governing Council, are formally called “ECB staff 
macroeconomic projections for the euro area”. For simplicity, we refer to them as ‘ECB forecasts’. 
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public) and the forecasts errors were rather significant. Similar conclusion applies to headline 
inflation, which was systematically over-predicted in 2014-16 (panel B). Since 2017, actual 
inflation has increased along with the forecast, but this was the outcome of two incorrect 
views: the forecast increase in core inflation (which has not happened) and the assumption of 
broadly unchanged energy prices (which have increased rapidly).
It is notable that while the ECB has over-predicted inflation developments, it has 
under-predicted GDP growth since 2014. That is, actual GDP growth has turned out to be 
systematically higher than ECB forecasts (panel C). This also implies that the underlying 
assumed relationship between growth and inflation was even more inaccurate: better than 
expected GDP growth should have resulted in higher than expected core and headline infla-
tion, but in fact, core inflation (and also headline inflation for a number of years) has been 
significantly lower than expected.
Labour market forecasts are similarly characterised by large and systematic errors. The 
forecast errors of the unemployment rate (panel D) mirror the forecast errors of GDP: as GDP 
growth became better than expected, the unemployment rate also fell faster than expected, 
which are consistent developments. But the unemployment rate forecast errors highlight that 
the ECB’s underlying Phillips curve assumption is flawed: faster than expected unemploy-
ment rate decline should have led to faster than expected rising inflation, but on the contrary, 
core inflation (and also headline inflation until 2016) turned out to be lower than predicted. 
Wage forecasts also turned out to be grossly inadequate in 2013-16, though since 2017 
wages have generally grown in line with predictions (panel E). Yet this particular recent wage 
growth forecast success is inconsistent with the faster than expected reduction in the unem-
ployment rate and the lower than expected core inflation increase, highlighting the uncer-
tainty of the underlying economic relationships assumed in ECB forecasting exercises. 
Figure 12: ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, average annual values
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Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat and various vintages of ECB forecasts. Note: Actual data is the thick red line (moving 12-month or 4-quar-
ter averages), while the thin colourful lines show the ECB forecasts made in each quarter. ECB forecasts are available for annual values. 
That’s why we use the 12-month (or 4-quarter) average rate of change for the actual data in the case of inflation, GDP growth and the wage 
growth, while the 4-quarter moving average rate of unemployment. Such moving average data is (practically) equal the annual average 
in the 4th quarter (in case of quarterly data) or December (in case of monthly data) of each year. In the chart the end observation (in Q4 or 
December of various years) of each forecast curve corresponds to the annual average forecast numbers published by the ECB. We have 
linearly interpolated the annual average forecast data and the data in the quarter (or month) of the date of the forecast. Note that the actual 
data for the quarter (or month) when the forecast is made is not yet known at the time of the forecast, given data publication delays.
Certainly, the ECB is not the only institution whose forecasts turned out to be incorrect. 
Many other central banks, international institutions and other forecasters made large fore-
casting errors even in the last five years, when economic conditions improved. Such fore-
casting failures should foster a general debate on forecasting practices. Yet the ECB’s forecast 
errors and its inability to lift core inflation above 1 percent have major implications.
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public) and the forecasts errors were rather significant. Similar conclusion applies to headline 
inflation, which was systematically over-predicted in 2014-16 (panel B). Since 2017, actual 
inflation has increased along with the forecast, but this was the outcome of two incorrect 
views: the forecast increase in core inflation (which has not happened) and the assumption of 
broadly unchanged energy prices (which have increased rapidly).
It is notable that while the ECB has over-predicted inflation developments, it has 
under-predicted GDP growth since 2014. That is, actual GDP growth has turned out to be 
systematically higher than ECB forecasts (panel C). This also implies that the underlying 
assumed relationship between growth and inflation was even more inaccurate: better than 
expected GDP growth should have resulted in higher than expected core and headline infla-
tion, but in fact, core inflation (and also headline inflation for a number of years) has been 
significantly lower than expected.
Labour market forecasts are similarly characterised by large and systematic errors. The 
forecast errors of the unemployment rate (panel D) mirror the forecast errors of GDP: as GDP 
growth became better than expected, the unemployment rate also fell faster than expected, 
which are consistent developments. But the unemployment rate forecast errors highlight that 
the ECB’s underlying Phillips curve assumption is flawed: faster than expected unemploy-
ment rate decline should have led to faster than expected rising inflation, but on the contrary, 
core inflation (and also headline inflation until 2016) turned out to be lower than predicted. 
Wage forecasts also turned out to be grossly inadequate in 2013-16, though since 2017 
wages have generally grown in line with predictions (panel E). Yet this particular recent wage 
growth forecast success is inconsistent with the faster than expected reduction in the unem-
ployment rate and the lower than expected core inflation increase, highlighting the uncer-
tainty of the underlying economic relationships assumed in ECB forecasting exercises. 
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4.2 Can certain labour market factors explain the forecasting failures?
The labour supply in the euro area has increased for two main reasons: 
• The labour force participation rate has been steadily increasing (Figure 13); 
• Net immigration into the euro area was also substantial, and not just because of the major 
inflows of refugees in 2015-16. 
An expanding labour force could put wages under downward pressure. If the ECB has 
persistently underestimated the expansion of the labour force, this factor could explain the 
persistent forecast errors in relation to wage and price increases. But such a persistent under-
estimation of labour force expansion is not consistent with the unemployment rate forecast 
errors, because faster than expected labour force growth should have resulted in larger than 
expected unemployment. But the opposite has happened. 
Figure 13: Labour force participation rate (age 15-64, % of population), 1997Q1-
2018Q2
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Another explanation for the repeated forecast errors could be related to the esti-
mate of the non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment (NAWRU). NAWRU cannot be 
observed, but is estimated using certain econometric techniques17. Taken literally without 
the consideration of any additional factor, the NAWRU concept suggests that when actual 
unemployment is the same as the NAWRU, wage growth does not accelerate. But if actual 
unemployment is below the NAWRU, wage growth acceleration should be expected, while 
an unemployment rate above the NAWRU should lead to a deceleration of wage growth. A 
possible explanation for the ECB forecast errors could be that in real-time the ECB thought 
that the actual unemployment rate was already below the NAWRU and thus predicted an 
increase in wage growth and inflation. But a year later it could have turned out that the ini-
tial NAWRU estimate was wrong and the new NAWRU estimate is much lower, and therefore 
there was excessive labour supply in the past year which kept wage growth and inflation 
growth low, while unemployment fell to approach the NAWRU. Persistent NAWRU estima-
tion errors could explain the persistent forecast errors. 
Unfortunately, the ECB does not publish its NAWRU estimates. However, the European 
Commission publishes its NAWRU estimates, which are made using the commonly agreed 
methodology in the EU. While Havik et al (2014, p11) define the concept as “trend un/
17  In Darvas and Simon (2015) we critically evaluate the NAWRU estimates of the European Commission and high-
light that its estimation is subject to major uncertainties, while initial estimates are revised significantly later. 
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employment to be consistent with stable, nonaccelerating, (wage) inflation (NAWRU)”, in 
practice either the change in the growth rate of nominal unit labour costs (related to the 
so-called ‘traditional Keynesian Phillips curve’ – TKP) or the growth rate of nominal unit 
labour cost (related to the so-called ‘new Keynesian Phillips curve’ – NKP) is analysed18. 
Some additional variables also enter the equations used to estimate the NAWRU, namely 
labour productivity growth and a terms-of-trade indicator in the TKP framework, and lags 
in the NKP framework. Thereby, a European Commission NAWRU estimate cannot be taken 
literally to indicate the non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment, partly because unit 
labour cost is studied (and thus instead of the name NAWRU, the name ‘non-accelerating 
unit labour cost rate of unemployment’ should be used), and partly because of the other 
factors considered. Still, the gap between the actual unemployment rate and the Commis-
sion’s NAWRU estimate could be a proxy for the labour market pressure on nominal wage 
growth developments.
The ECB’s own estimates might not be much different from the Commission estimates, 
so we look at Commission’s NAWRU estimates (Figure 14). The euro-area NAWRU estimates 
were revised downward for two main reasons. First, unit labour costs and wage growth have 
not picked up. Second, the estimated model assumes smooth development of the NAWRU, 
so an actual fall in the unemployment rate leads to downward revisions of past NAWRU 
estimates. 
However, Figure 14, which shows the actual unemployment rate data available in 
autumn 2018 and the real-time NAWRU estimates, highlights that the actual rate has been 
persistently higher than the real-time NAWRU estimates. 
Figure 14: Actual unemployment rate and the European Commission’s NAWRU 
estimates
Source: Bruegel based on various vintages of the AMECO database related to the European Commission’s forecasts, see https://ec.europa.
eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-performance-and-forecasts/economic-forecasts_en.
Table 1 reports the perceived real-time gap between the unemployment rate and the 
NAWRU estimate, because, for example, in autumn 2013 the actual unemployment rate for 
2013 was not yet known and an estimate was made. 
18  Havik et al (2014) reports that the EU’s Economic Policy Committee endorsed a NKP specification for 21 of the 28 
EU member states (of which 12 are currently members of the euro area) and a TKP specification for the remaining 
7 countries (all 7 are members of the euro area).
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Table 1: Estimated real-time gap between the actual unemployment rate and the 
NAWRU (European Commission estimates)
real time estimate 2018 autumn estimate
2013 spring 1.3 2.6
2013 autumn 1.4 2.6
2014 spring 1.7 2.4
2014 autumn 1.7 2.4
2015 spring 1.2 2
2015 autumn 1.1 2
2016 spring 0.7 1.3
2016 autumn 1 1.3
2017 spring 0.5 0.7
2017 autumn 0.5 0.7
2018 spring 0.1 0.3
2018 autumn 0.3 0.3
Source: Bruegel based on various vintages of the European Commission forecast, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/eco-
nomic-performance-and-forecasts/economic-forecasts_en.
Table 1 shows that there has always been a positive gap between the unemployment 
rate and the NAWRU in the European Commission’s real-time estimates. This should have 
implied an expected deceleration in the nominal unit labour costs growth rate, and possi-
bly nominal wages too and therefore the ECB should have not predicted wage growth (and 
consequent inflation) acceleration in the first place. Because of the later downward revisions 
of the NAWRU estimates, the gaps between the actual unemployment rate and NAWRU were 
apparently greater in autumn 2018 than in real time, but the important point that there was a 
positive gap even in real-time estimates. 
Inflation forecasts takes into account other factors beyond the NAWRU. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to note that while the perceived unemployment gap has narrowed (Table 1) and 
thus its deflationary impact has also narrowed, the predicted pace of wage growth and core 
inflation acceleration were rather similar during the past five years (Figure 12). This might 
indicate that NAWRU was not an important aspect of the ECB’s core inflation forecasts. 
Looking ahead, if the expansion of the labour force slows down and the recently acceler-
ated wage growth continues, we might perhaps see the rise of core inflation. Furthermore, if 
the NAWRU concept is valid after all and current estimates are somehow more reliable than 
the unreliable past estimates, then the elimination of the positive gap between the actual 
unemployment rate and the estimated NAWRU (Table 1) might also suggest that wage pres-
sure could increase in the coming years.
But a number of factors call for caution about the potential for increased euro-area core 
inflation: 
• In the euro area, the trend of labour-force participation growth continues; higher la-
bour-force participation rates in Japan, Sweden and the United Kingdom suggest that 
there is still ample room for the euro-area rate to further increase (Figure 12);
• Core inflation has so far remained stable despite some wage increases (Figure 12);
• Current wage increases still remain short of the wage growth observed in the early 2000s 
when core inflation was close to 2 percent;
• The unemployment rate is only a partial indicator of labour market slack. ECB (2017) 
estimates suggest that the shares of ‘underemployment’ (reflecting involuntary part-
time employment) and of those who are available but not seeking work have increased 
compared to the pre-crisis situation. Bell and Blanchflower (2018) also showed that the 
underemployment rate in several euro-area countries is rather high and higher now than 
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in the early 2000s. Those part-time workers who wish to work full time could exert down-
ward pressure on wage growth;
• The Phillips curve, which in its most basic setup measures the relationship between 
unemployment and wage growth, is found to become flatter in advanced countries (Ku-
ttner and Robinson, 2010; Claeys et al, 2018). This implies that the relationship between 
demand conditions (including unemployment/underemployment) and wage and price 
inflation is weaker and thus a further fall in unemployment (or underemployment) is less 
likely to be followed by increased inflation. 
These are mainly pertinent over the medium and long terms, but there are also some 
shorter term-issues that call for caution about the possibility of core inflation acceleration. 
Euro-area business surveys show some darkening of the economic outlook, which might have 
already contributed to the slowdown in economic growth in the third quarter of 2018. The 
recent rapid fall in oil prices will soon exert downward pressure on headline inflation and 
might also hold back core inflation.
All these factors suggest a high level of caution when considering when the ECB might 
raise interest rates and the path of the prospective increase, if the ECB continues to pursue a 
goal of close to two percent inflation. 
4.3 What is needed? More time, more monetary stimulus or a new inflation 
target?
Market-based inflation expectations already show concern about the credibility of the 
ECB’s somewhat ambiguous ‘below, but close to, two percent over the medium term’ 
clarification of its inflation goal. Even though headline inflation was in the range of 
2.0-2.2 percent from June to November 2018 and wage growth has recently accelerated, 
market-based expectations of average headline inflation in the next five years had fallen 
to 1.2 percent by early December 2018 (Panel A of Figure 15)19. Longer-term expectations 
also fell (Panel B of Figure 15): the so-called 5y5y market-based inflation expectation (five 
year average inflation expected in five years’ time) fell from values of between 2-2.5 per-
cent in 2004-14 to 1.6 percent in December 2018. While 1.6 percent might as arguably be 
considered still relatively close to two percent, the 1.2 percent expected average inflation 
in the next five years is not so close and further repeated forecasting failures might lead to 
further falls in expected inflation, ultimately undermining the ECB’s credibility.
The Bank of Japan is a telling example. There seems to be sufficient evidence to con-
clude that the Bank of Japan has failed to reach the 2 percent inflation target though it has 
an even more forceful monetary policy toolkit than that applied by the ECB (Shirai, 2018). 
And it is unlikely that the target will be reached in the years to come. Long-term headline 
inflation expectations have fallen back to zero (panel B of Figure 15). In our view, the 
Bank of Japan will probably have to acknowledge its failure to reach the 2 percent target 
and then revise the target.
At the same time the Federal Reserve was successful in bringing inflation back to two 
percent. Whether the structural characteristics of the euro area are closer to Japan or to 
the US is an important question for discussion. However, the ECB’s failure to raise core 
inflation above one percent with a large monetary policy arsenal at a time when GDP 
growth and employment turned out to be better than expected should provoke a discus-
sion about the forecasting failures and the ability of the ECB to influence core inflation. 
More time is needed to see if the forecasting failures of the past five years were driven 
by factors whose impact will gradually fade away, or if the ECB’s ability to lift core infla-
tion has been compromised. In the meantime, the ECB will surely stick to its current 
aim of below, but close to, 2 percent inflation over the medium term. For this period we 
recommend an extremely cautious approach to monetary tightening. The forecasts them-
19  Unfortunately, such expectations are not available for core inflation.
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selves should not be enough to justify a rate increase. A rate increase is only recommended 
after a significant increase in actual core inflation. We also suggest making this intention clear 
in the ECB’s forward guidance. In our view, the ECB’s current forward guidance is insufficient: 
“The Governing Council expects the key ECB interest rates to remain at their present levels at 
least through the summer of 2019, and in any case for as long as necessary to ensure the contin-
ued sustained convergence of inflation to levels that are below, but close to, 2 percent over the 
medium term.” (13 September 2018 ECB press release20). Likewise, we recommend the size 
of the ECB’s balance sheet should be kept unchanged in the foreseeable future, and a gradual 
process of its reduction should begin only after the first few interest rate hikes, conditional on 
not jeopardising the inflation outlook.
Figure 15: Market-based five year average headline inflation expectations, June 
2004 – December 2018
Source: Bruegel based on Bloomberg; monthly average data is reported. Note: December 2018 values are based on the first five days of 
the month.
20  https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2018/html/ecb.mp180913.en.html. 
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
UK
United
States
Euro
area
Japan
A) Next five years
B) Five years starting in five years’ time
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
UK
United
States
Euro
area
Japan
21 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚24 | December 2018
Such a cautious monetary policy exit strategy might work, but we cannot exclude the pos-
sibility of repeated failures in forecasting and in lifting core inflation. Such an outcome would 
undermine the credibility of the ECB and would necessitate a discussion on either the deploy-
ment of new tools to influence core inflation, or a possible revision of the ECB’s inflation goal. 
5 Euro-area countries face different 
financial stability risks
Beyond the overall macroeconomic issues, central banks might weigh the issue of financial stability 
when considering the normalisation of monetary policy. Financial stability concerns are on the rise 
in some euro-area countries. As argued by Darvas and Merler (2013), there are strong interactions 
between monetary policy and financial stability policy: both have implications for the other. That’s 
why there should be close cooperation (and not a Chinese wall) between these two main policy 
areas, though they should operate with different instruments to achieve their different goals. 
Monetary policy should not be used to achieve a financial stability objective, partly because 
the main monetary policy instrument, the interest rate, is too broad and ultimately quite inef-
fective in dealing with the build-up of financial imbalances (Claeys and Darvas, 2015; Claeys 
et al, 2018). For example, Posen (2009) showed that it is difficult to find a clear relationship 
between interest-rate tightening and the growth rate of asset prices. He concluded that the use 
of interest rates to prevent the build-up of financial imbalances appears to be ineffective. In rela-
tion to the housing bubble in the United Kingdom before the crisis, Bean et al (2010) estimated 
that additional increases in the Bank of England’s main rate by several percentage points would 
have been needed to stabilise house prices. Such interest rate increases would have reduced 
inflation to levels significantly below the Bank of England’s 2 percent target, and would have had 
significant negative effects on output. The Swedish example (section 2.1) also highlighted that 
the 2010-11 monetary policy tightening for financial stability reasons backfired and necessitated 
an even more significant monetary easing later in response to weaker inflation, growth and 
employment. Moreover, the Swedish household debt-to-income ratio was not affected by the 
2010-11 policy of tightening.
Furthermore, monetary tightening for reasons of financial instability might have other unin-
tended effects, especially in open economies. An increase in capital inflows because of higher 
interest rates can partially offset the dampening effect of higher rates on credit. A monetary 
tightening can also cause a migration of activity from the regulated banking sector to the shad-
ow-banking sector (Nelson et al, 2015).
Therefore, even though close cooperation is recommended between financial stability and 
monetary policymaking, we advise against using monetary policy tools for financial stability 
purposes. 
The euro-area situation is further complicated by the significant differences between euro-
area members, as argued by Darvas and Pichler (2018). Financial stability concerns would 
suggest an interest rate increase in some countries (eg Slovakia, where household loans and 
house prices are increasing very rapidly), but not in others (eg Italy, where household loans are 
stagnant and house prices continue to fall). But monetary policy cannot discriminate between 
euro-area countries, so beyond the conceptual issues, the euro area’s variability further high-
lights that monetary policy is not a useful instrument for containing financial stability risks. 
The most suitable tool for tackling financial stability risks in the euro area is country-specific 
macroprudential policy (Darvas and Merler, 2013). The EU’s macroprudential framework allows 
competent national authorities (mostly national central banks) to implement country-specific 
macroprudential measures. In some euro-area countries, certain vulnerabilities have already 
led to measures, including capital buffers for systemically important institutions, countercycli-
cal capital buffers, and debt-to-income ratio limits and loan-to-value ratio limits (Table 2).
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Table 2: Macroprudential policy measures in European countries, mid-2018
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Austria Y Y
Belgium Y Y
Capital add-on for 
banks with excessive 
trading activities as 
measured according 
to two indicators 
(volume-based, risk-
based).
Bulgaria Y Y Y
stress-tests, capital 
rules for bank 
dividend distribution, 
reporting rules, 
exposure to Greek 
equity, liquidity 
coverage ratio
Cyprus Y Y
stress-tests, caps on 
deposit interest rates, 
liquidity coverage 
requirement add-on
Czech 
Republic
Y Y Y
Denmark Y Y Y Y
limits to lending 
growth, short funding 
and large exposures
Estonia Y Y
Finland Y Y Y
France Y Y Y
French Systemically 
Important Institutions 
shall not incur an 
exposure that exceeds 
5 % of their eligible 
capital for NFCs or 
group of connected 
NFCs assessed to be 
highly indebted.
Croatia Y Y
Hungary Y Y Y
liquidity coverage 
ratios, foreign 
exchange assets rules
Ireland Y Y Y
Introduction of a 
set of requirements 
for loan originating 
alternative investment 
funds.
Iceland Y Y Y
Liechtenstein Y Y
Lithuania Y Y
23 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚24 | December 2018
Luxembourg Y Y stress-tests
Latvia Y
Malta Y Y NPL limits
Netherlands Y Y Y
Norway Y Y Y Y
liquidity coverage 
ratios
Poland Y Y Y
liquidity coverage 
ratios
Portugal Y
Romania Y Y Y
consumer loan rules, 
foreign exchange 
assets rules
Sweden Y Y Y Y Y
Pillar II capital 
add-on, increased 
transparency in 
capital requirements, 
increased risk 
weights for corporate 
exposures, risk 
weights
Slovenia Y Y
cap on deposit 
interest rates, loan-to-
deposit ratios
Slovakia Y Y Y Y
maturity limits for 
consumer loans
United 
Kingdom
Y Y Y Y
leverage ratios
Germany Y
Spain Y
Italy Y
Greece
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